The Future European Constitution: The Polish Point of View by Barcz, Jan
Area: Europe - ARI Nº 97/2004 
        5/24/2004 
 
 
The Future European Constitution: The 
Polish Point of View 
 
 
Jan Barcz.∗ 
 
 
 
Theme: The author presents the Polish point of view on the controversy surrounding the 
decision-making process by a qualified majority in the future European Constitution. 
 
 
Summary: At the European Council’s session of 25/26 March of this year real prospects 
of achieving a compromise on the text of the Constitutional Treaty finally became evident. 
The Council emphasised that ‘agreement on the Constitutional Treaty should be reached 
no later than the June European Council’. This statement referred to the Irish 
Presidency’s opinion that there was a real possibility of reaching a compromise on 
decision-making by a qualified majority, ‘based on the principle of double majority’, which 
‘must allow for greater efficiency in the decision making process than the provisions in the 
current Treaties, and must have due regard to balance among all member States and to 
their specific concerns’. In reference to other complex issues, such as the size and 
composition of the Commission, the scope for qualified majority voting and minimum seat 
thresholds in the European Parliament, the Irish Presidency considered that an overall 
solution could be found ‘if there is sufficient political will and flexibility’. 
 
 
 
Analysis: If the Irish Presidency’s surmises are correct, this is good news for everyone: 
for the ‘old’ member States, for the Union as a whole, for Central and Eastern Europe 
and, of course, for Poland. The conflict over the Constitutional Treaty should not be 
overstated: sooner or later a solution will be found since the Nice Treaty (which was 
somewhat forgotten in the discussions in Poland) included ‘a temporary institutional 
package’ for 27 member States which will in any case have to be reconsidered on the 
accession of a 28th member State, while the Union can continue functioning even without 
a Constitutional Treaty. 
 
However, the conflict over the European Constitution –on the eve of the Union’s 
enlargement– brought other problems to the surface: 
 
• In the ‘old’ member States it became a sign of a ‘return to the past’, suggesting a lack 
of confidence in the new member States and a considerable anxiety towards the 
forthcoming enlargement. Ultimately, the process was considered to lead to the 
weakening of Germany in the Union, undermining its position in Central and Eastern 
Europe, and simultaneously only apparently strengthening the Franco-German axis, 
since it put off the solution to the EU’s power-sharing problems until later. 
 
• It weakened the feeling of solidarity with the new member States which had gradually 
been built up during the previous years. This was aggravated by the turbulence 
caused by transatlantic disagreements on security issues and by the temptation of 
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imposing a ‘multi-speed’ Europe by the larger ‘old’ member States to ensure their 
political leadership in the future Union. 
 
• In Central and Eastern Europe the conflict brought narrowly domestic interests to the 
fore, undermining Central-European regional cooperation as an important factor for 
European integration. 
 
• Finally, for Poland the deepening of the conflict led to a break in the foreign policy 
implemented up to its accession to the EU. It would now enter the Union in conflict 
with its most important neighbour, Germany, with the situation further aggravated by 
the poor bilateral relations resulting from the lack of a political vision for the future and 
consequently weakening the role of the ‘Weimar Triangle’ as a catalyst for cooperation 
in Central and Eastern Europe. The result was that Poland’s intention of playing a 
substantial and constructive role in the Union’s so-called eastern dimension (including 
its relations with Russia) would become a mere illusion. 
 
Since the consequences of the deepening crisis surrounding the Constitutional Treaty 
project are so serious, it is necessary to reflect on the causes which led to this situation. 
 
Most of all, the crisis revealed the weakness of the connection between the ‘old’ and the 
new member States, with poor political communication also being caused by a lack of 
trust, despite the long-drawn accession negotiations and membership of the North Atlantic 
Alliance. This political communication deficit was marked by statements such as that 
suggesting that it would be the best for the candidates to remain silent, revealing the 
apparent difficulties in accepting the change in status from candidate countries to 
partners. Poland’s response was an outburst of political anger resulting from its sensitivity 
regarding its recently regained sovereignty (which is not fully understood in Western 
Europe), further aggravated by a difficult, not to say catastrophic, domestic political 
situation (which was also not taken into account by the ‘old’ member States). 
 
The dilemmas facing the ‘old’ member States derive from the fact that the Union’s 
population will not only double but that the differences between member States will 
dramatically increase –especially from the point of view of their economic capacity–. Thus, 
ensuring –in the new conditions– the capacity and coherence of the future Union is a 
substantial challenge. However, the method adopted to reach a solution during the 
Convention and in the initial stages of the Inter-governmental Conference (IGC) was more 
than problematic. Furthermore, the ‘old’ member States had great difficulty in agreeing on 
a common position, being unable to subsume their own national interests, although the 
much criticised Nice Treaty was of their own creation, while the impact of the candidate 
countries on the IGC 2000 was very limited. Neither did they take into account that 
strengthening ‘the EU Community area’ is in the objective interest of the new member 
States. 
 
Consciously or not they chose the following methods: 
 
• The fait accompli. Among other things, there was a lack of detailed discussion in the 
Convention regarding the formula for making decisions by a qualified majority: 
objections were ignored and the procedure was speeded up, leaving no time for 
discussions afterwards (which –particularly in Poland– would have been 
indispensable) and leading to the establishment of the IGC before the enlargement of 
the Union. 
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• The ‘back against the wall’. Last year in Brussels the discussion at the highest political 
level was reduced to a ‘yes or no’ solution, with no deeper exchanges of views taking 
place. If there had been a greater exchange of views in the first months of 2003 the 
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later debate would have been different, especially in Poland (at least among experts), 
where the advantages of the so-called ‘double majority’ were underestimated. 
 
Furthermore, Poland failed to act effectively: Polish diplomacy realised too late that 
decision-making by a qualified majority was one of the most important decisions proposed 
by the Convention, while the Convention itself was treated almost until the end as merely 
a kind of ‘scientific seminar’. Deficient political communication with the main players in the 
debate, France and Germany, led to positions being radicalised. Superimposed on this 
was a growing domestic political crisis that led to certain especially negative 
consequences: 
 
• Following the June 2003 accession referendum the general attitude towards the Union 
reversed under the influence of increasingly populist agitation resulting from the 
confrontation between the ruling party and the opposition. 
 
• With such a domestic political situation the government’s stance became ‘Nice or 
death’. Getting out of the deadlock was not made easier by the EU blaming Poland for 
the crisis and thereby covering up the essence of the problem. 
 
A possible area for compromise 
The conflict had a mainly political character but there was still substantial room for 
manoeuvre to reach a compromise. A detailed discussion was however needed. A 
compromise could –at least theoretically– be found in the Nice formula and the formula 
proposed by the Convention: 
 
• A compromise based on the Nice formula could be based on differentiating the 
decision-making power of the various member States, especially in the group of larger 
states –to the advantage of Germany–. It could also be based on making the decision-
making process more flexible by lowering the percentage threshold of weighted votes 
necessary for approval or blocking. Other interesting ideas were also presented. 
 
• A compromise based on the double majority formula proposed by the Convention 
could have several variants, depending on the number of States necessary to approve 
a proposal (over 50% according to the Convention’s proposal) and the required 
demographic representation (at least 60% in the Convention’s proposal). There were 
also suggestions that the demographic threshold could be made more flexible in a 
way similar to the so-called ‘Ioannina compromise’. 
 
• A further independent solution appeared in the guise of the so-called rendez-vous 
formula, whose essence was to empower the Council in the Constitutional Treaty to 
decide on a formula based on a qualified majority. Obviously, the decision had many 
controversial aspects, mostly concerning the mechanism by which the Council would 
make its final decision (whether unanimously, by a qualified majority or in any other 
way). 
 
In order to reach a compromise, on the one hand what should be taken into account are 
the interests of Poland and Spain, which by virtue of the Nice Treaty were provided with 
an especially strong position. On the other hand, it should also be considered that the 
double majority ensures a greater flexibility of the decision-making process and simplifies 
it. While the ‘double majority’ would allow the larger States, such as Germany, to fulfil their 
full potential in the decision-making process, the Convention’s proposal –especially the 
proposed 60% demographic threshold–would allow them to do so at the expense the 
‘medium-large’ States (ie, Spain and Poland). This assessment is corroborated by the so-
called Banzhaf index. 
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Finding a compromise therefore requires a detailed discussion of the existing possibilities. 
Poland and Spain consider it essential to retain the decision-making power resulting from 
the Nice Treaty although it might also be guaranteed within the framework of the double 
majority but providing some form of political compensation in institutional terms (mainly in 
the allocation of seats in the European Parliament). Eventually, a coherent decision-
making process for the future Union must be adopted, but not just as regards the formula 
itself but also (and perhaps more importantly) about the areas in which the qualified 
majority mechanism is to be applied. 
 
Possibility of a compromise 
If no compromise is reached, and thus no Constitution adopted, the situation would be 
politically disadvantageous from all points of view. There would also be negative 
consequences of a legal and political nature. The Nice package has a temporary nature 
as it is envisaged for a 27-member State Union. The possibility of incorporating a 28th 
state would again force the Union to fall back on a qualified majority and an appropriate 
solution would have to be established in the subsequent accession treaty (alternatively it 
would be necessary to call another Inter-governmental Conference on the basis of Article 
48 of the EU treaty). Placing such a burden on future accession negotiations would be 
very risky. The conclusion appears to be clear: the Constitution should include a decision-
making formula by a qualified majority. 
 
A further problem would be to determine the date on which the new qualified majority 
system should enter into force. Most of all it should be noticed that the Nice agreement 
will be formally in force until the accession of the 28th member state. The Convention’s 
proposal sets the entry into force of the new formula for 1 November 2009 (it does not 
explain how the system will work if before that date the number of member States 
exceeds 27). It is therefore worth considering the relation between the entry into force of 
the new qualified majority and accession to membership of the EU by the 28th member 
state. Such a solution would guarantee a gradual transition from the Nice system to the 
new qualified majority system. The application of the rendez-vous formula might also be 
considered in this context. 
 
As to the actual formula itself, it will doubtless be based on the so-called double majority. 
As mentioned above, such a formula might –in principle– be accepted by Poland if it 
retains ‘decision-making power’ comparable to the position guaranteed by the Nice 
Treaty. This could be achieved in two ways: 
 
• By considering the thresholds of states number and population potential required to 
the decision making. 
• By establishing specific rules for achieving a blocking minority. 
 
In the latter area some very interesting proposals have appeared recently, setting blocking 
minorities as a combination of a certain population percentage along with a specific 
number of States. The system should seemingly guarantee –within the framework of the 
double majority– an acceptable decision-making power (comparable to that guaranteed 
by the Nice Treaty) to the ‘middle-large’ states (Spain and Poland). A disadvantage of the 
proposal is that further enlargements will make it necessary to redefine the number of 
states required to establish a blocking minority. Perhaps it would be better to decide on 
the number of States required to establish a blocking minority in another way –eg, at one-
fifth (ie, five with 25 member States)? 
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Finally, it should be borne in mind that a compromise regarding decision-making by a 
qualified majority must also take other circumstances into account. On the one hand, it 
should be considered that the larger member States renounced a commissioner in the 
course of the present enlargement process and that they are justified in expecting some 
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form of political compensation. On the other hand, decision-making by a qualified majority 
in the Council is connected with the allocation of seats in the European Parliament: the 
areas covered by qualified majority decisions are usually covered by the ‘co-decision 
procedure’ (Article 251 of the EU Treaty). Some compensation for the interests of Poland 
and Spain could also be sought in this field. 
 
Conclusions: The aim of the IGC is not only to decide upon a compromise to make 
possible the signing of a Constitutional Treaty, but also to make it possible for the Treaty 
to be ratified, ie, to ensure its political and social acceptance in each of the member 
States. 
 
It should be borne in mind that the domestic political situation in Poland is especially 
difficult and that prospects for the next few years remain unclear. In any case, the 
attractiveness of populist arguments is on the increase (and not only in Poland). The two 
or three years subsequent to entry into the EU will be difficult, as was the case with the 
1995 enlargement which involved countries that had far more stable political systems than 
Poland has at present. 
 
What should be the response to such a challenge? In Poland it is indispensable to create 
a pro-union platform, over and above the present political parties, to ensure ratification of 
the Constitutional Treaty. Ratification will be difficult, since what is required is the consent, 
either expressed in a statute adopted by a two-thirds majority in both chambers of 
parliament or by consent as expressed in a nation-wide referendum of more than half of 
those entitled to vote. It is evident that, under the currently unstable political 
circumstances in Poland, the creation of a such a multi-party platform will be complicated 
while the incentive to engage in populist manipulation will be significant. 
 
Such a situation must be taken into account by the ‘old’ member States. A substantial 
change from the methods employed in previous years is necessary: patience, detailed 
and insightful analysis of the problems involved and a balancing of interests will be 
required while the new member States adapt to the new decision-making mechanisms. 
 
The compromise agreed on in the IGC must meet the approval of not only the political 
elite but most of all it must gain social acceptability: it will then be the time to start 
benefiting from the opportunities of the closer regional and local contact fostered by the 
Union. 
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